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For Teachers, A Better Kind of Pension Plan 
By Marcus A. Winters 
 
Teachers unions often defend defined benefit (DB) retirement plans on the grounds that they 
ensure retirement security. For teachers, it might be comforting to know that upon retirement you 
will receive a fixed (and generous) check each month for the rest of your life regardless of what 
the stock market does between now and then. But the security from investment risk inherent in 
DB plans masks another sort of risk to which teachers are greatly exposed because of how their 
DB plans are designed. We might call it attrition risk — the chance (likelihood) that an entering 
teacher is not employed within a school covered by the same pension plan for her entire working 
career. 
 
I suspect that many teachers don’t realize that the extent to which they benefit from their pension 
plan depends on their employment longevity. Those who stay employed by public schools 
covered by the same plan (most often that includes all public schools within a state) for their 
entire career make out great. Those teachers who leave participating public schools earlier (i.e., 
the majority of entering teachers) do not. Of course, at the time they are hired, no one knows 
which type of teacher they will turn out to be. 
 
In this article, based largely on several studies that I conducted with my co-author Joshua 
McGee, I illustrate how the severely backloaded structure of today's public school teacher 
pension systems benefit only a small proportion of entering teachers while putting the rest on an 
insecure retirement path. I then describe a cost-neutral solution to the problem that would benefit 
the majority of those entering public school classrooms today without removing any of the 
protections from the stock market with which teachers have become accustomed. 
 
Retirement (in)security 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, about 89 percent of public school teachers 
participate in DB plans that provide them with fixed payment for life at the time of retirement 
(often adjusted for inflation). Many people prefer the traditional DB model because their 
guaranteed retirement amount suggests a far safer — though potentially less lucrative — 
retirement wealth than offered by 401k-style defined contribution systems that are subject to the 
whims of the stock market over time.  
 
But the DB structure of teacher pensions has produced a common misperception that today's 
teacher pensions ensure a safe retirement path for all. They don’t. These pension plans are 
structured such that teachers earn very little retirement benefit for their first several years of 
teaching and then rapidly accrue pension wealth as they near the “normal” retirement age. 
Unfortunately, the large majority of teachers who begin their working lives teaching in a 
particular state’s public school system won't last there long enough to accrue their pension 
reward. 
 
This problem is common but not inherent to DB retirement plans. It is driven by the fact that the 
benefit is a function of their final average salary. A retired teacher’s monthly pension payment is 
based on a calculation that takes into account the number of years that the teacher worked within 
a school covered by the plan (usually all public schools in the state) and the teacher's final 
average salary (often the average salary over the last three years of employment). For each year 
of service within a covered school, the plan increases the fixed payment by an additional 
percentage (often about 2 percent) of their final average salary. A penalty is imposed for each 
year a teacher exits prior to what is known as the time of "normal" retirement. Once the teacher 
no longer works within a school covered by the plan, he stops accruing years of service and thus 
does not increase pension wealth within the plan. 
 
Because it comes in the form of a fixed payment for life, the total amount of a teacher's pension 
benefit depends both on the amount of the monthly payment and also how long the teacher lives 
past retirement age. Nonetheless, we can use conventional actuarial techniques in order to put a 
dollar value on the teacher's annuity. We calculate the present value of the teacher's annuity, net 
of the teacher’s contributions, under the rules of her pension plan were she to exit after any 
number of years after being hired. 
The design of teacher pension programs is such that the value of a teacher’s retirement wealth 
(present value of the lifetime annuity) can change suddenly at various points across a career. The 
annuity’s value increases linearly as a teacher earns more service, but it also increases in big 
jumps at particular points in time as a teacher approaches specified retirement thresholds. 
Conversely, a teacher’s annuity generally loses value each year after reaching the plan’s normal 
retirement eligibility threshold because with each additional year of work that teacher is forgoing 
a year of retirement in which a payment would have been received.  
 
To illustrate, the blue line in Figure 1 shows the accumulation of pension wealth across the 
career of a 25 year-old entrant into the New York City teaching workforce. The line represents 
the present value of the teacher’s accumulated employer-provided pension wealth (that is, 
excluding the teacher's contribution) at any given age. 
 
 
As is typical in other systems, New York's teachers earn very little employer provided retirement 
wealth in the early and middle portions of their careers, followed by steep accrual each year of 
service in late career, and negative accrual each year after reaching the plan’s normal retirement 
age. A teacher who began working in the New York City public school system at age 25 and 
exited the system 38 years later would retire with an employer funded lifetime annuity worth 
about $610,250 — an average of $16,059 per year of service. However, had that same teacher 
exited the state’s public school system after twenty years of service (perhaps, as previously 
pointed out on these pages by by Goldhaber, Grout, and Holden to take a teaching job in another 
state), the employer contribution to her retirement would be a lifetime annuity worth only about 
$59,572 —  an average of $2,979 per year of service. 
 
Winners and losers under the current system 
Teachers can’t take home their retirement money until they retire. The backloaded nature of the 
pension plan, then, is not particularly concerning for entering teachers who are certain to remain 
employed by a public school covered by their plan until retiring at or around age 63 — to the 
extent that such people actually exist. But for those who don’t fit that profile, the backloaded 
structure of today’s pension plans has serious consequences. Unfortunately, the majority of 
teachers leave well before they might benefit from the structure of the retirement plan.  
The dashed black line in Figure 1 illustrates, at each age, the percentage of an entering cohort of 
25 year-old teachers whom the pension plan assumes will remain in the system, using the scale at 
the right of the figure. Only a third of teachers from the cohort in New York City are expected to 
remain long enough to receive the maximum pension payout at age 63. It's worth noting that this 
result from New York's plan likely downplays the problems faced by those teaching under other 
public teacher pension plans across the nation because New York’s assumed turnover is far 
lower, and thus more conservative, than those used by most other pension plans. According to 
our calculations, based on figures reported by the Institute for Educational Sciences, only about 
28 percent of American public school teachers nationwide remain in the profession for even 20 
years. 
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Consider three hypothetical teachers — Emily, Julie, and Sarah — all of whom were 25 when 
they began teaching during the same school year. Each remained in teaching for their entire 
career until retiring forty years later. Emily taught her entire career in New York City and then 
retired with an employer-sponsored annuity worth about $592,158. Julie worked within the 
Philadelphia school system for her entire career and retired with an employer-sponsored annuity 
which we calculate to be worth $404,433.  
 
Sarah, on the other hand, worked in the New York City school system for the first fifteen years. 
Then, when her partner was transferred to another job, Sarah moved to Philly and worked in the 
public school system for the remaining twenty years of her career. Sarah taught within the same 
school systems for the same amount of time as did Emily and Julie. But she didn't remain in 
either system long enough to benefit from the pension backloading. Consequently, Sarah retired 
with employer-sponsored pension wealth worth only about $62,089. 
 
It could be worse. According to a report from Bellwether Education Partners, teachers covered 
by seventeen statewide pension plans don't fully vest for 10 years. So, someone who teaches 9 
years in Illinois, 9 years in Indiana, and 9 years in Michigan before leaving the profession would 
have earned zero employer-sponsored pension wealth for their 27 years of service to students.  
 
It's perverse, but today's pension systems don’t just anticipate that the majority of teachers won't 
last long enough to collect meaningful pension wealth; they count on it. The relatively high 
pension payoffs provided to those who leave the plan at or near the age of “normal” retirement 
(Emily and Julie in our example above) are funded by redistributing dollars away from the 
pension wealth of those teachers who exit earlier in their careers (our unfortunate Sarah). 
 
A smooth accrual pension plan 
There is nothing inherent in the market protections of DB plans that requires retirement wealth to 
be accrued so late in a teacher's career. We propose to reform the structure of teacher pensions in 
such a way that teachers earn retirement wealth in relatively equal intervals throughout their 
careers. Simply moving compensation around in this way would cost taxpayers nothing and 
would not expose teachers to any additional market investment risk.  
We call our alternative structure a Smooth Accrual Defined Benefit plan (SA DB). By smooth 
we mean that the benefits earned by teachers are a constant percentage of their cumulative 
earnings. Like other DB plans, the SA DB would offer teachers a lifetime annuity at retirement.  
To be clear, this plan is in every way a DB plan. I am not describing a 401k or other defined 
contribution plan. Further, the plan is structured to have the same expected value as existing 
plans, and thus does not represent an aggregate benefit reduction. Consequently, this proposed 
change would not itself address the pressing issue of large unfunded liabilities tied to pension 
plans that is pressuring many state budgets. The only difference between a current plan and its 
respective cost-equivalent SA DB plan is the rate at which teachers accrue pension wealth during 
each year of employment. The SA DB plan pays meaningful retirement benefits for each year of 
a teacher’s service.  
The red line in the figure represents the wealth acquired at each period for our 25 year old entrant 
in New York City under a plan that allows teachers to smoothly accrue retirement compensation 
across their careers. The line is calculated to represent a cost-neutral plan for taxpayers relative 
to the current plan.  
Teachers acquire significantly more retirement wealth early in their careers under the smooth 
accrual plan than under the current plan. For example, a teacher who exits the district at age 45 
with 20 years in the classroom receives the equivalent of $59,572 in retirement wealth under the 
current plan, but would leave with $151,120 under a smooth accrual plan. Because the current 
pension plans redistribute foregone retirement wealth from those who exit earlier to them, those 
teachers who remain employed within the New York City plan from age 25 until the normal 
retirement age do better under the current backloaded system. A teacher who retires at 63 would 
receive the equivalent of $610,250 in an annuity under the DB, but would have earned $415,107 
under the smooth accrual plan.  
 
In short, the new smooth-accrual plan would benefit some teachers while offering lower 
retirement wealth to others. The question is, what proportion of entering teachers would benefit 
from each plan? 
 
We can see from the figure the age of retirement at which teachers would benefit most from each 
of the two plans, along with the percentage of teachers who are actually still teaching at that age. 
Those who leave early in their careers would receive more from the smooth-accrual plan, as 
represented by the red line, which lies above the (blue) line representing wealth under the current 
plan. The advantage shifts to the current plan at the point at which the lines cross, which in the 
case of New York City happens at age 56. At present, only about 42% remain employed in the 
schools past this age, which is to say that fewer than half of teachers benefit from the current 
plan. 
 
Again, New York's plan is a conservative representation of the backloading phenomenon facing 
public school teachers across the nation. In Philadelphia, for instance, only about 18% of 
entering teachers are expected to remain employed in the state system long enough to benefit 
from the current plan relative to how they would fare under a cost-equivalent SA DB plan. 
 
A more fair system 
Proponents of the current plan structure sometimes argue that its design incentivizes teachers to 
remain teaching in their schools for a sustained period of time, thus limiting turnover. In fact, it 
can be seen from the figures and from empirical research that teacher exit decisions are sensitive 
to the incentives produced by the accrual pattern of their pension plans. 
 
In recent research, we present simulations showing that given what research shows about teacher 
experience and classroom effectiveness, moving from the current system to a SA DB plan would 
be expected to have minimal impact on teacher quality. But even if we were to concede that 
keeping teachers within their school is a desirable goal, is it right to do so by jeopardizing the 
retirement security of the majority of entering teachers? There has to be a better way. 
 
Perhaps backloaded pension plans were justifiable in the age in which they were developed, 
when populations were less mobile. But few young people today enter any job or career knowing 
for certain that they will remain there for their entire working life. Further, if implemented with 
fidelity, policies recently enacted across the nation that weaken the employment protection 
offered to public school teachers might add considerable additional attrition risk. Several districts 
and states now strip tenure protections from teachers who receive below-standard performance 
evaluations over a period of time. Experienced teachers who were once protected from 
termination by their tenure status now might face the real possibility of losing their jobs. This 
prospect is particularly chilling for a teacher with about twenty years in the classroom. Were 
such a teacher to lose her job due to poor performance she would not only lose her salary but 
also leave with very little retirement wealth for the first two decades of her working life. 
Allowing teachers to acquire retirement wealth smoothly throughout their careers would lessen 
the blow of such layoffs considerably. 
Public school teachers deserve a compensation system that puts them on a secure path towards 
retirement. Many teachers have been lulled by the defined benefit structure of their pension plan 
to believe that their futures have been cared for. Unfortunately, for the majority of those entering 
classrooms today, that is just not the case. Unless states move to a more smoothly accruing plan 
the situation will only worsen in the future as teachers, like other professionals, become more 
mobile.  
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